Postscript to the War of 1812 NEWASH, TECUMSETH, and US/Canada Border Relations – Spring 2012
The Great Lakes… 84% of the continent’s fresh water… a different story in every drop.
By LeeAnne Gordon
This year marks the beginning of bi-centennial celebrations commemorating the War of 1812, bringing new attention to the conflict which greatly shaped the cultural geography of the Great Lakes, as well as the rest of the country. Little has been written, how- ever, about the period immediately after the war, when the United States and Canada struggled to put aside the conflicts and come to peace with one another. On the Great Lakes today, we have the opportunity to observe that peace, found in the navigable waters that form the border in our region. It is appropriate, then, that the subject of post-war relations can be viewed in the history of two vessels, Tecumseth and Newash, built by the Royal Navy in the months following the Treaty of Ghent, which sailed for less than two years before being retired in favor of peaceful relations.
The Treaty of Ghent formally ended hostilities between the United States and Great Britain when it was signed on December 24, 1814. Peace between the United States and Great Britain had been under negotiation in Europe for some time, but officers on the Great Lakes frontiers knew peace was easier to achieve in a document than on a gundeck. Along the Great Lakes frontier, neither country was entirely ready to abandon the military vessels and outposts that had been constructed and populated during the war. American desires to conquer Canada had manifested themselves in several unsuccessful American raids into territory north of the border. The British had managed to repulse each invasion with the aid of native tribes. Still, the British were not eager to leave the frontiers undefended, particularly those along the Great Lakes, which offered an easy passage into Canadian lands.
In early 1815, Edward William Campbell Rich Owen had inherited a precarious perch as the Royal Navy’s Senior Officer of all troops in Canada, stationed at Kingston, Ontario. E.W.C.R. Owen’s jurisdiction included the Canadian shores of the Saint Lawrence River, the lakes Ontario, Erie, and Huron and the waters between. He was responsible for overseeing operations on naval ships along those waterways, and for coordinating with British troops in the adjacent regions. The Treaty of Ghent had promised both nations free navigation of the waters along the borders, even while the exact location of the border had not yet to be determined.
The close proximity of a former enemy was an unusual situation for the British. Cut off as the British Isles were from the rest of Europe, the Royal Navy was more familiar with having vast expanses of open water separating them from aggressors. The comparatively small size of the Great Lakes, however, gave the British opportunity to keep close watch on American activities, but also left them exposed to American activities. Provisions in the Treaty of Ghent returned any occupied lands back to their antebellum status, but said nothing of the manner in which lands could be defended. The British felt that maintaining naval vessels on the water was necessary to keep Americans from encroaching again into Canada. As natural geographic features — such as the Niagara River — prevented easy navigation along the entirety of the Great Lakes frontier, it was necessary to maintain multiple military establishments, despite the difficulties of keeping them informed and supplied.
The Battle of New Orleans has always been an ironic postscript to the War of 1812, fought after the treaty ending the war had been signed, but before news had spread. New Orleans was not, however, the last place to receive news of peace. Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall, commander at Fort Michilimackinac at the far end of Lake Huron, received word of the Treaty of Ghent on 11 May 1815.1 This was nearly five months after the treaty had been signed, and a full two months after a letter containing the news had been dispatched. News was not the only thing that traveled slowly on the Lakes, and as the British were not willing to leave Canada undefended, the Royal Navy was presented with a new mission of provision transportation and peacekeeping.
The problem of transporting stores was greatest in Upper Canada, particularly in reaching the fortifications at the far end of Lake Huron.
E.W.C.R. Owen determined to build a small number of transport vessels. After some consideration, E.W.C.R. Owen determined that two transport schooners would be constructed on Lake Erie for service on both lakes. The lateness of the season concerned the Commodore. In a letter of 6 April 1815, E.W.C.R. Owen wrote, “I intend no longer to delay it, and will take immediate measures with the Commissioner for building on some convenient situation, a couple of sharp vessels.”2
Construction was led by Robert Moore, assistant shipwright at the Kingston yard, and he and a party of shipwrights and artificers departed for Lake Erie. With no extant shipyard on the lake, a suitable place had to be located before work could begin. The eventual site was located along the Niagara River, near the entrance to the Chippewa River. The mouth of the Chippewa River was blocked by the hulls of two schooners that had been scuttled there in 1814. Plans were made to raise and re-fit these schooners to act as transports as well. A nearby farm, owned by the Street family, provided adequate land for a temporary shipyard and wood was harvested from local resources along the rivers.
The proximity of the farm to the Chippewa River allowed shipwrights to work simultaneously on the schooners that were raised and the two new schooners. These were named Huron and Sauk, outfitted in the late spring and early summer of 1815, and put to immediate use transporting supplies on Lake Erie. For the new vessels, E.W.C.R. Owen specified, “two stout vessels of about 130 tons each,”3 though the ships would actually be slightly larger. He offered names for the ships: “I propose to name them Tecumseth and Newash from two friendly Indian Chiefs.”4 Tecumseth, also spelled Tecumseh, was a Shawnee warrior who resisted the encroachment of the United States into Indian lands. Later a British ally, he was killed in the Battle of Moraviantown in 1813. Newash was an Ojibway chief and British ally as well.
Robert Moore’s draughts of the two schooners built at Street’s Farm was made on 23 April 1815, as a plan for the ensuing construction. As drawn, the schooners were 166 12/94 tons burthen, almost 25% larger than Owen’s original orders. The draught shows they were 70 feet 6 inches on deck, with an extreme breadth of 24 feet 5 inches. The ships drew 6 feet of water forward and 9 feet aft. The drawing of the vessels shows that they were purpose-built, able to carry supplies and provisions, but also envisioned to serve as warships should the need arise.
Owen wrote that the schooners were to be, “adapted to receiving guns and acting as Men of War at any time hereafter if it shall be necessary.”6 Two 24-pounder long guns were mounted abaft the foremast on pivots, to maximize versatility and two 24-pounder carronades were placed on carriages abaft the mainmast. The decision on whether or not to carry the weapons was left to their commander. Captain William Bourchier, placed in command of the Lake Erie vessels, was instructed that, “such of the Guns as you think proper may be left on shore.”7 Complements of the vessels were reduced from typical wartime numbers, but the sailors were trained as soldiers as well. Owen instructed that, “the Seamen are to be exercised and trained to the use of Small Arms, the same as the Marines; one half of the Seamen of each Are to be armed with Muskets, and the rest with Cutlass, Pike and Pistol.”8
The keels of Newash and Tecumseth were laid in the middle of May 1815, and construction continued at a brisk pace in the following months. Newash and Tecumseth were launched on 13 August 1815, their interiors whitewashed and the hulls painted black and yellow above the waterline. The schooners were launched without any armament and without their sailing rigs, which were quickly added. The new vessels joined Huron and Sauk before the close of navigation in the 1815 season, and were just as quickly immersed in the tense postwar climate.
In October 1815, Newash, under the command of Lt. Thomas Bushby, was sailing amongst the islands at the western end of Lake Erie. Onboard was the commander of Sauk, returning to his vessel, which was lying off Amherstburg. Newash’s crew observed a small schooner apparently coming from the Detroit River, and Bushby attempted to hail her, seeking news on Sauk. The incident, seemingly harmless from Bushby’s perspective, incited a fury of words and activity across the border.
Bushby’s account of the incident states:
“On my passage from Fort Erie to Amherstburg…I met a Schooner on the N.W. Side of Middle Island at which I fired a musket, she hoisted American Colours, as she did not shorten sail nor attempt to pass within hail, I fired another, she then brought to and hoisted her boat out, I then tacked and hove to close to her and desired her to send her boat on board…Master came on board, after having inquired where she came from, where she was bound, and whether she had passed any Men of War at Amherstburg I told the Master he might proceed.”9
The American schooner was named Mink and was said to have been in the employ of the British Commissariat. The incident made a distinct impression on at least one passenger aboard Mink at the time. Shortly after the schooners’ encounter, an editorial appeared in the Niagara Journal. The editorial was informed by the events witnessed by the passenger aboard Mink, although it contained a very different description of the incident than that recorded by Lieutenant Bushby.
“ ‘British Outrage!’
‘The American Schooner Mink, Captain Hammond, on her Passage from Detroit to Buffalo, when passing the British Armed Schooner Nawash, [sic] Lieut. Drury, [sic] on the 1st Instant, near Ballast Island, about two Miles [—km] from Put-in-Bay, was fired upon by the Schooner without being hailed, or receiving the least other previous intimation.
“–The shot passed just over the Bowsprit of the Mink.– Captain Hammond immediately hoisted American Colors supposing that to be the object of the British.– Another shot was then fired from the Schooner, which passed through the foresail of the Mink, not four feet from where the Passengers were standing on the Deck.–
“Captain Hammond then brought his Vessel to, although there was great danger in doing it, of falling on the Breakers.
“–The British Commander ordered him to send his Boat on board the Nawash [sic]– the Boat was accordingly got out, and Captain Hammond went aboard.–
After making a number of trifling inquiries relative to the News at Detroit, and the Passengers he had aboard, the British Officer ordered him to return to his Vessel, without assigning any reason for his outrageous Conduct!’ ”10
The unnamed editorialist was doubtlessly annoyed by the incident, and may have presumed that the Mink had been brought to so that Bushby could search for British deserters. Seen from that light, the Newash-Mink incident touched on the still-tender subject of British impressment of American citizens. The matter of impressment had been one of the key aggravations that led the American government to declare war against the British in 1812. Americans perceived the issue as a threat to their national sovereignty and the issue was particularly sensitive to the Americans. President Thomas Jefferson, writing just as he received word of the peace, noted, “I am glad of it, although no provision being made against the impressment of our seamen, it is in fact but an armistice, to be terminated by the first act of impressment com- mitted on an American citizen.”11
The matter of British and American relations on the Great Lakes weighed heavily on the mind of E.W.C.R. Owen and his successor, brother W.F.W. Owen. In late 1815, E.W.C.R. Owen wrote of his concerns regarding, “how much the authority of Government and Justice is weakened by its distance from the seat of the Government, by the irregularity and difficulty of communication and the want of a Superintending power immediately at hand.”12 He wanted to strengthen the British presence in Canada, and maintain a military superiority over the Americans. “To this we may impute in some degree the growth of American feeling and Connexion [sic] which will require a firm and steady hand to wean them from, and prove to them (as is the fact) that the Interest of that portion of the United States which borders on the Lakes is much more in our hands, than that of the British Colonists can be in theirs.”13
W.F.W. Owen was understandably concerned over the state of affairs between the two countries. He pointed out that, “the recent occurrances [sic] on the more distant parts of the Frontier [have] so much the character of Enmity [sic] and so little of a Pacific disposition.”14 The governments in London and Washington may have been ready for peace, but the atmosphere of amity was not yet present on the Great Lakes frontier.
The next years for Tecumseth and Newash were more affected by diplomacy than anything else. Both vessels continued to sail the waters of Lakes Erie and Huron, usually in company with each other. The British officers who commanded squadrons on the lakes of Canada, and some of the men who worked under them, were used to warfare. These men had come of age steeped in the Napoleonic wars in Europe and were offered their own commands during the War of 1812. Part of the reason for some of the potentially volatile acts on the frontier may be that they simply did not know how to be officers at peace. W.F.W. Owen described the task of transporting stores as, “a Service so essentially different from our usual employment.”15
Additionally, the Great Lakes put these officers into a very unique position. The Treaty of Ghent secured the rights of both nations to navigate the waters of the Lakes freely. While allowing for increased trade and open commerce, this provision also resulted in an increase in smuggling. On Lake Erie, Captain Bourchier encountered this situation directly and felt obliged to take on the task of enforcing revenue laws on Lake Erie.
At both ends of the lake, American territory was at extremely close proximity and the unguarded expanses of Lake Erie allowed plentiful opportunities for illegal trade and smuggling. Bourchier was certainly aware of the lake’s legacy and the extant sentiments on the late war. Bourchier wrote of his assignment, “I am well aware we are placed on Lake Erie, on a very ticklish footing.”16 Finding the four schooners under his command the only royal authority on Lake Erie, Bourchier determined to use his authority to support the government of Upper Canada. W.F.W. Owen seemed to support Bourchier’s determination and wrote to non-naval officials for verification.
“[Captain Bourchier] has directed His Majesty’s Naval Officers to aid and support the Government of this Province in the execution of the Revenue laws, it being notorious that smuggling is carried on to very great extent…The prevention of smuggling would be a direct object of pursuit to engage the attention of the Naval Service on the Lakes and would operate more than any other regulation to bring it to perfection, by insuring to its Officers the best local knowledge and most fitting experience ….I would ask for you to allow Officers, Boats and Crew to carry out these duties…and also that we be furnished with…the revenue laws and Coast regulations.”17
W.F.W. Owen did acknowledge that he was “not aware how far the Laws of Great Britain apply in such a case to this Province,” but was surprised by what he received in response. Governmental authorities in Upper Canada felt that the current civil authority was sufficient for the enforcement of its own laws, and refused to grant such authority to the Royal Navy. Darcy Boulton, Attorney General, elaborated: “The British Statutes are confined to the Sea…but in this part of the Globe, I am of the opinion that the Navy can have no Authority in times of Peace, unless Authorized by an Act of Parliament…Vessels of the United States…may pass unmolested, unless directed by the [Customs] Collector.”18
Lake Erie is connected to Lake Huron by two rivers, the Detroit and Saint Clair, and a small lake, Lake Saint Clair. Several islands in the two rivers were still disputed after the end of the war. Among these was Bois Blanc Island, near the British depots at Amherstburg and Fort Malden. A small channel separated Bois Blanc Island from the mainland of Canada. Another channel on the western side of Bois Blanc Island also offered adequate passage for vessels, and Bourchier considered the border to lie there. The British viewed Bois Blanc Island as their territory, and Bourchier felt that if the mainland and offshore island were British, then the channel between them was under royal jurisdiction. Bourchier may not have received W.F.W. Owen’s communication on the role of the Royal Navy when he issued a verbal order on 31 May to board and search all vessels transiting the channel off Amherstburg. He delicately clarified his position in a written order issued nearly two months later: “Herewith you will receive a chart of the river Detroit which has not been finished. You will ascertain the soundings between the Island of Bois Blanc and the U.S. Should there be eleven feet [3.38m] water you will board all vessels passing through the Port of Amherstburg.”19
The Lieutenants commanding Tecumseth and Newash began halting vessels so they could board and search them, which quickly piqued American interests. The goings on of some vessels, such as the American schooners Ghent and Brock, were recorded in logbooks and transmitted between vessels. Ghent was suspected of housing British deserters and had been boarded in Buffalo. Another particular boarding incident involved the American brig Union.
While transiting the Detroit River, the American brig Union had sailed into the passage east of Bois Blanc Island. H.M. Schooner Tecumseth brought the brig to, boarded and searched her. Though the incident did not appear to disturb the master of the Union, an irate passenger brought the matter to the government’s attention. The passenger’s story claimed that the British naval officer was, “supported by the Officer at [Fort] Malden, who drew out some pieces of cannon, and placed them in a situation to bear upon the American Vessel.”20 Major Berwick, commanding officer at Fort Malden, formally denied this charge. Lieutenant Kent, in command of Tecumseth, did not feel that any indignity had been offered the other officers, as “they have always been treated as the subjects of a Nation at Amity with His Majesty.”21
Unlike the British, the Americans did not consider either Bois Blanc Island or the Port of Malden as British, and saw no reason to avoid either channel. Michigan Governor Lewis Cass viewed the channel as, “the usual Channel of communication between Lakes Erie [and] Huron.”22 Cass’s opinion of the boarding of the brig Union was that the situation warranted Washington’s attention.
“In an aggression like this the Government of the United States can alone determine what course the honour [and] interest of the Nation require should be taken. But until their decision shall be made upon the subject, it becomes my duty to remonstrate against a practice for which the Laws of Nations afford no pretence, which is inconsistent with the relations existing between our respective Governments, [and] the continuance of which must be attended with serious [and] important consequences.”23
The case of the Union and of the actions on Lake Erie was brought to the attention of British Minister Plentipotentiary Charles Bagot, in Washington, D.C. Bagot was already involved in negotiations over the finer post-war details, such as the number and size of the naval force on the Great Lakes. Bagot may have agreed with other Royal Navy authorities who felt that Bourchier had overstepped the bounds of his authority, and had concerns on the effect that Bourchier’s actions would have on Anglo-American relations. Captain William Baumgardt wrote to Bourchier: “It is to be regretted that you should ever decree it necessary without reference to your commanding officer to adopt such measures as may in their operation, compromise the good understanding of the two Nations.”24
The Rush-Bagot Agreement
Negotiations had been underway since the signing of the Treaty of Ghent as to the state of affairs between the naval powers. Charles Bagot had been in communication with then Secretary of State James Monroe throughout much of 1815 and 1816. Monroe and the rest of the American government felt that naval power should be severely limited on the Great Lakes, as “[maintaining] on the Lakes a large Naval Force, it would expose both [nations] to considerable and useless expence [sic] while it would multiply the risks of collision between them.”25
Along those lines, John Quincy Adams, one of the American negotiators at Ghent, had proposed a drastic reduction of force from both sides. Adams’ proposal called for “one vessel on each of the Lakes [less than or equal to] 100 tons burthen with one 18-pdr gun, [and] none on Lake Champlain.”26 Though this proposal was made shortly after the peace, British authorities avoided agreeing to any arrangement for several months. The British, particularly Captain W.F.W. Owen, felt that conceding to the United States’ request to limit both countries to the same number and size of vessel would place the British at a disadvantage in North America and leave Canada particularly vulnerable to American encroachment: “[To] reduce our armed forces to a level with what they may without endangering their safety reduce their to, would be to reduce ourselves as much below their actual force as their Physical strength and attainable resources exceed ours.”27
American invasions of Canada during the War of 1812 left the British wary of reducing their naval force in areas where Canada was weak. W.F.W. Owen wrote of his fears regarding the potential result of such a scenario. Without a standing naval force, he felt, it would cost exorbitant rates to transport men and stores. He also foresaw future problems with a lack of knowledge of the waterways.
This would force the British to employ “American subjects on almost every occasion, which would not only operate to cramp the industry [and] exertions of this infant colony, but would foster [and] nourish a race of people, who in our own employment, would acquire the most accurate knowledge to be applied against us in the event of a future war; whilst on the other hand we should be left in emergency to be defended by the resources [and] Men of the mother country at a hundred fold rate of expense as was the case during the late War.”28
Instead of a reduction of naval force that would place each country on par with the other, the British government proposed a gentlemen’s agreement. Optimistically trusting the new spirit of amity between the two countries, Britain suggested that each nation reduce its naval force to the minimum required to perform the requisite duties. This would allow both nations “to act in a spirit of mutual confidence without shackling either by any precise stipulations.”29 The American feeling prevailed — unless the numbers of ships on the Lakes was drastically reduced and limited, there would be more opportunity for conflicts between the two nations.
American negotiations mentioned the actions of Captain Bourchier on Lake Erie and the British had little recourse. Even his fellow British officers had judged Bourchier’s actions overly zealous and unnecessary. In spite of W.F.W. Owen’s agreement with some of Bourchier’s policies and the fact that enforcement of revenue laws was eventually granted to the naval force, the manner in which Captain Bourchier had pursued his course left the British no point from which to argue. One zealous officer could shatter the brittle façade of peace with the right opportunity. On 2 August 1816, James Monroe drafted a new arrangement of reduced naval force that would eventually be accepted by both nations. The final agreement was signed by Charles Bagot and American Richard Rush. Each nation would retain one vessel on Lake Ontario of no more than 100 tons burthen, with one 18-pdr gun; two like vessels with like armament on the Upper Lakes; and one like vessel with like armament on Lake Champlain. Monroe’s proposal further stated that:
“all other armed vessels on those Lakes shall be forthwith dis- mantled, and likewise that neither shall build or arm any other Vessel on the shores of those Lakes…That the Naval Force thus retained by each party on the Lakes, shall be restricted in its duty to the protection of its Revenue laws, the transportation of troops and goods, and to such other services as will in no respect interfere with the armed vessel of the other parts.”30
The Rush-Bagot agreement disarmed the Great Lakes and rendered Newash and Tecumseth obsolete. Even without their 24-pounder guns, the hulls were larger than 100 tons. Each vessel was to be laid up, stripped of her guns and most of her other equipment, and left at anchor. Penetanguishene Bay, on Lake Huron, was chosen as the retirement home for the two hulls, and they arrived there on 18 June 1817, just a few weeks after the Rush-Bagot Agreement had been passed and signed. The sails were loosed one last time to dry, then unbent from the yards, booms, gaffs and stays. Each of the masts was brought down and the smaller spars were laid on the decks. The ships were moored with iron cables, and the pennants were hauled down at sunset on 30 June 1817.
Newash and Tecumseth both fell into disrepair and eventually sank at the harbor in Penetanguishene Bay. In the 1950s, archaeological investigations of the harbor led to the raising of the hull of Tecumseth, which is on display at Discovery Harbour (Havre de la Dècouverte) along with a sailing replica in Penetanguishene, Ontario.
The short sailing careers of Tecumseth and Newash offer tremendous insight into a perplexing, if brief, period in Great Lakes history as the inhabitants adjusted to life as peaceful partners rather than combatants. There remains no standing navy on the Great Lakes, though the Rush-Bagot agreement has been altered somewhat since its original conception. Both the United States and Canada use sites on the Lakes as training centers for naval personnel. Coast Guard stations have also been set up on both sides of the border, but serve as bases of security and law enforcement, rather than military posts. Until 2001, the majority of Coast Guard vessels were armed in compliance with the treaty. After September 2001, the United States Coast Guard chose to equip several vessels on the Lakes with large caliber weapons, as a measure of national security. Since this was found to be a policing and peacekeeping purpose, Canada conceded to the armament.
1 Robert McDouall to Forster, 15 March 1815, in William Wood, Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, vol. III, part I, 532.
2 E.W.C.R. Owen to Drummond, 6 April 1815, PRO, Record Group 8, Series IC, vol. 734.
3 E.W.C.R. Owen to Croker, 19 April 1815. LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 1/2262. 4 E.W.C.R. Owen to Croker, 19 April 1815. LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 1/2262. 5 Draft of Schooners. PRO, Admiralty Fonds, ADM, Reg. No. 4562, Box 64.
6 E.W.C.R. Owen to Drummond, 4 April 1815. PRO, Records Group 8, Series IC, vol. 734.
7 E.W.C.R. Owen, “General Instructions for the Commander of the Naval Establishment upon Lake Erie,” 12 October 1815. LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 1/2264.
8 E.W.C.R. Owen to the Captain Commanding the Naval Establishment at Isle Aux Noix, 15 June 1815. LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 106/1997.
9 Thomas Bushby to Bourchier, 9 November 1815. PRO, Record Group 8, Series IC, vol. 736.
10 Enclosed in E.W.C.R. Owen to Baker, 23 October 1815. LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 1/2264.
11 Thomas Jefferson to Crawford, 14 February 1815, with Postscript dated 26 February. “American Memory, The Thomas Jefferson Papers.”
12 E.W.C.R. Owen, “Observations relative to the defence [sic] of the Lake Frontier continued from enclosures to Letters 36, 37 and 48,” 5 November 1815. LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 1/2264.
13 E.W.C.R. Owen, “Observations relative to the defence [sic] of the Lake Frontier continued from enclosures to Letters 36, 37 and 48,” 5 November 1815. LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 1/2264.
14 W.F.W. Owen to Drummond, 17 January 1816b. LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 1/2265.
15 W.F.W. Owen to Drummond, 21 April 1816. LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 1/2266.
16 William Bourchier to Baumgardt, enclosed in William Baumgardt to Bagot, 5 September 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 1.
17 W.F.W. Owen, “Extract of a letter from Captain [W.F.W.] Owen to Lieutenant Governor Gore, dated Kingston Naval Yard 21 March 1816.” LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 1/2266.
18 Darcy Boulton, “Case for the Opinion of the Attourney [sic] General respecting Seizures or Searches on the Lakes in Canada by the Navy.” LAC, Admiralty Fonds, ADM 1/2266.
19 William Bourchier to the Commanding Officers of H.M. Vessels on Lake Erie, 23 July 1816, enclosed in William Baumgardt to Bagot, 5 September 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 1.
20 Charles Bagot to Sherbrooke and Commodore E.W.C.R. Owen, 14 August 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 1.
21 Henry Kent to Bourchier, 28 July 1816, enclosed in William Baumgardt to Bagot, 5 September 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 1.
22 Lewis Cass to the Officer Commanding His Britannic Majesty’s Schooner Tecumseth, n.d., enclosed in William Baumgardt to Bagot, 5 September 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 1.
23 Lewis Cass to the Officer Commanding His Britannic Majesty’s Schooner Tecumseth, n.d., enclosed in William Baumgardt to Bagot, 5 September 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 1.
24 William Baumgardt to Bourchier, 5 September 1816, enclosed in William Baumgardt to Bagot, 5 September 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 1.
25 James Monroe to Bagot, 2 August 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 14.
26 James Monroe to Bagot, 2 August 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 14.
27 W.F.W. Owen to Baumgardt, 3 September 1816, enclosed in William Baumgardt to Bagot, 5 September 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 1.
28 W.F.W. Owen to Baumgardt, 3 September 1816, enclosed in William Baumgardt to Bagot, 5 September 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 1.
29 W.F.W. Owen to Baumgardt, 3 September 1816, enclosed in William Baumgardt to Bagot, 5 September 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 1.
30 James Monroe to Bagot, 2 August 1816. LAC, Bagot Papers, Military Group 24, Series A13, vol. 14.
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About the Author: LeeAnne Gordon was born in Erie, Pennsylvania, and has been a lifelong Great Lakes resident. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in English from Auburn University and a Master’s in Anthropology from Texas A&M University. Miss Gordon was awarded the Association of Great Lakes Maritime History Barkhausen Award in 2009, and this article was excerpted from her entry. In addition to her academic career, she has been a tall ship sailor for the past nine years, sailing on all five Great Lakes on several different vessels.